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BARTNICKI AS LOCHNER: SOME THOUGHTS ON FIRST
AMENDMENT LOCHNERISM
Howard M. Wasserman*
INTRODUCTION
"First Amendment Lochnerism" sounds like a constitutional oxymoron. On
one hand is Lochner v. New York,' the reviled and discredited member of the
constitutional anti-canon,2 and its derivative, Lochnerism, "one of the worst
charges that can be leveled against a doctrine or constitutional interpretation, an
unequivocal normative repudiation" of what the court has done. On the other
hand is the most favored status of the First Amendment freedom of speech.4 In
fact, there has been increased talk in recent years of the link between the two in
5 6particular areas of law.5 These areas include the law of consumer information,
campaign financing,7 broadcast regulation,8 and copyright. 9
Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law.
1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a state law limiting bakers to
60-hour work weeks).
2. Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day it Was Decided:" Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REv. 677, 681-682 (2006) [hereinafter Balkin, Wrong] (describing Lochner
"as an established element of the anti-canon," one of the cases that must be wrong); see also David
E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (arguing that Lochner and its era have been central to
constitutional debate for the past century).
3. Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REv.
1149, 1212 (2005); see Balkin, Wrong, supra note 2, at 682 ("A surefire way to attack someone's
views about constitutional theory was to argue that they led to Lochner."); John Hart Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 940 (1973) (arguing that
the charge of Lochnerism "alone should be enough to damn" any decision); David A. Strauss, Why
Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. Cmi. L. REv. 373, 373 (2003) [hereinafter Strauss, Wrong] (stating
that Lochner would "win the prize ... for the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred
years").
4. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ExTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA 7 (1986) ("[T]he free speech idea nonetheless remains one of our foremost
cultural symbols." (emphasis in original)); Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 175, 176 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R.
Stone eds., 2002) [hereinafter ETERNALLY VIGILANT] ("Different societies have different
argumentative showstoppers, but in the United States it is often the First Amendment that serves
this function .... "); David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in
ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra, 33, 59 [hereinafter Strauss, Common-Law Constitution] ("The text of
the First Amendment is an important cultural reference point."); Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic
Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 367, 380 (2004) (describing the principle of
freedom of speech as an "icon").
5. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99
MICH. L. REv. 281, 286 (2000) (describing the need "to avoid a revival of Lochner through First
Amendment analysis"); Richards, supra note 3, at 1212 (describing "striking parallels" between
Lochnerism and certain First Amendment arguments).
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A different approach to understanding First Amendment Lochnerism is to
identify and examine one particular case or constitutional rule that creates the
potential for courts to behave in the free speech context the way Lochner-era
courts were accused of behaving in the realm of liberty of contract and economic
substantive due process.' 0 Jed Rubenfeld made this limited inquiry and found
United States v. O'Brien," the draft-card burning case that establishes the
standard for evaluating incidental restrictions on symbolic expression and
expressive conduct, to "be something like Lochner v. New York all over again."'12
A potentially Lochnerian decision of more recent vintage is Bartnicki v.
Vopper.13 In Bartnicki, a divided, somewhat confused, and highly ambiguous
Supreme Court struck down a provision of the federal wiretap statute 14
prohibiting the disclosure of the contents of unlawfully intercepted electronic,
wire, and voice communications as applied to innocent third party
disseminators. 5  Bartnicki is a worthy candidate for the mantle of First
Amendment Lochnerism because it contains several of the distinct and disparate
features and characteristics captured by that appellation.
16
Applying the Lochnerism tag is not necessarily to condemn Bartnicki. As
we attempt to move beyond Lochner as an unthinking pejorative, 17 there is no
consensus as to what we mean, or what we are trying to say in shorthand, when
6. See Richards, supra note 3, at 1212-13 ("[T]here are some fairly strong parallels between
the traditional conception of Lochner and the First Amendment critique of data privacy
legislation.").
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1390, 1397 (1994) (arguing that the campaign finance reform decision in Buckley v. Valeo
"might well be seen as the modern-day analogue of the infamous and discredited [Lochner]").
8. See Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics of
Political Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1255-56 (2000) (describing "Speech Realists" who, like
the Legal Realists who criticized Lochner, argue for increased regulation of a range of speakers,
including broadcasters).
9. See David McGowan, Some Realism About the Free-Speech Critique of Copyright, 74
FORD. L. REv. 435, 448 n.58 (2005).
10. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The
Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383, 1387 (2001) ("The proper lesson of Lochner instructs
us that, even where it is possible to identify a jurisprudential basis for judicial decisions, if those
familiar with the Court's decisions do not believe those decisions to be socially correct, the work of
judges will be seen as illegitimate."); Richards, supra note 3, at 1215 ("Even if Lochner was not an
illegitimate injection of pro-business libertarian ideology into constitutional decisionmaking by
judges, it was widely condemned as such.").
11. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
12. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REv. 767, 771 (2001)
(comparing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) with Lochner).
13. 532 U.S. 519 (2001).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
15. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518, 525; see also Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband:
The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1100
(2002) (arguing that Bartnicki must be deciphered).
16. See infra Parts I, II.
17. See Richards, supra note 3, at 1213 (describing it as "rhetorically effective to accuse the
critics of Lochnerism and move on").
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we speak of Lochner and its various derivative verbs, nouns, and adjectives. 18
Recent scholarship suggests that the longstanding critiques of Lochner-that
courts improperly substituted their own views, biases, and preferences as to the
social and economic good for that of the legislature; 19 read their personal laissez-
faire business views into the Constitution;20 second-guessed the wisdom and
efficacy of legislative policy choices; 21 and aimed inappropriately rigorous
judicial scrutiny at ordinary economic regulation 22 -do not uniformly or
singularly reflect or explain what was going on in Lochner or why it is so
despised.23
Instead, recent efforts to reaccredit Lochner (timed, coincidentally, to the
target's centenary) reflect a reinforcement of aggressive rights-based judicial
review.24 That would include, of course, First Amendment review. To call a
decision such as Bartnicki-in which the First Amendment claim prevailed when
congressional legislation failed elevated judicial scrutiny 25-Lochnerian is to
suggest a structural or procedural problem with broad enforcement of individual
free speech rights.26 The pejorative nature of the term ultimately serves to
obscure meaningful substantive constitutional dialogue about the meaning of the
freedom of speech and how that freedom should be balanced against competing
constitutional, political, and social values.27
I will proceed in three steps. First, I examine what, precisely, we mean by
the pejorative tag "Lochner," "Lochnerism," or "Lochnerian," focusing on five
prominent characteristics or features of that concept and considering how each
18. Similarly there is no consensus on which form of the term "Lochner" is proper. One may
speak of "Lochnerism." One may speak of "Lochnerian" or "Lochneresque" judging, decision-
making, or results. One also may speak of attempts to "Lochnerize" the law. I will use all of these
terms somewhat interchangeably.
19. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 10, at 1385.
20. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 3, at 1212.
21. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 771.
22. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 3, at 1213.
23. See Strauss, Wrong, supra note 3, at 374 (arguing that many explanations have been
provided for the wrongness of Lochner, but concluding that no single criticism is universally
accepted).
24. See Friedman, supra note 10, at 1400.
25. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 (concluding that "a stranger's illegal conduct does not
suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern"); but
see Smolla, supra note 15, at 1150 (suggesting that Bartnicki could turn out to be a backhanded
victory for privacy, and thus a backhanded defeat for speech).
26. Friedman, supra note 10, at 1401-02 (describing arguments for stronger liberal
jurisprudence in the face of charges of Lochnerism); see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 205 (1993)
(arguing that Lochner has been used "as a weapon in conservatives' struggle against the modern
Court's use of fundamental rights as a trump on government power"); Richards, supra note 3, at
1213 (describing the Lochnerism underlying First Amendment arguments against certain laws
regulating privacy in consumer and personal data).
27. See Richards, supra note 3, at 1220 (arguing that Lochnerizing the First Amendment
would require "[e]very regulation that could be classified as restricting 'speech' ... [to] be brought
within the scope of First Amendment heightened review").
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translates (or does not translate) into the First Amendment realm. 28 Second, I
examine Bartnicki and the Lochneresque characteristics it possesses. 29 To the
extent we continue to apply the Lochner label in the First Amendment
conversation, Bartnicki remains a good illustration of the phenomenon. Third, I
examine one example of how Bartnicki has been applied, or not applied, by a
lower court so as to avoid Lochnerian results in a case involving government
regulations protecting personal privacy in consumer credit data and
information.30
I. LOCHNER AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The definitional problem is that we do not know what we mean when we
speak of "Lochnerism," "Lochnerian analysis," or "Lochneresque results. 31
Obviously, it derives from the Supreme Court's 1905 decision striking down a
state law limiting bakers to 60-hour work weeks.32 More broadly, Lochnerism
refers to the decisions of the constitutional era in which challenges to state and
federal economic regulations were evaluated against broad judicial protection for
freedom of contract under Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment substantive due
process.33 Plainly, at least in common legal discourse, Lochnerism is a
pejorative.34 As Bruce Ackerman said, "modern judges are more disturbed by
the charge of Lochnering than the charge of ignoring the intentions of the
Federalists and Republicans who wrote the formal text. 3 5
But that tells us nothing about the content of the attack reflected in the use of
the term, a content on which there is no consensus.36 Lochner is, to paraphrase
28. See infra Part I.
29. See infra Part H.A-B.
30. See infra Part H.C. See also Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 813 (D.C. Cir.
2001) [hereinafter Trans Union Il]; Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267. F.3d 1138, 1140 (D.C. Cir.
2001) [hereinafter Trans Union III]; Richards, supra note 3, at 1213 ("To the extent that the First
Amendment critique [of data privacy regulations] is similar to the traditional view of Lochner,
then, its elevation of an economic right to first-order constitutional magnitude seems similarly
dubious.");
31. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
32. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52, 64 (1905).
33. See Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 881,
881 (2005); Strauss, Wrong, supra note 3, at 373-74.
34. See Richards, supra note 3, at 1213; Balkin, Wrong, supra note 2 at 682 ("A sure fire way
to attack someone's views about constitutional theory was to argue that they led to Lochner."); Ely,
supra note 3 at 939-40 (arguing that the fact that a decision is grounded in the same philosophy as
Lochner "alone should be enough to damn it").
35. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 269 (1998); see also Bernstein,
supra note 2, at 1 n.2 ("Even today, Supreme Court Justices across the political spectrum use
Lochner as a negative touchstone with which they verbally bludgeon their colleagues.").
36. See Strauss, Wrong, supra note 3, at 374 ("The striking thing about the disapproval of
Lochner, though, is that there is no consensus on why it is wrong.").
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Justice Scalia, "a word of many, too many, meanings. 37 Or it is a word of no
meanings, akin, as Daniel Farber suggested in his oral remarks at the symposium,
to "judicial activism." 38
We can isolate five non-exhaustive, non-mutually-exclusive features that are
most prominent and prevalent in the Lochner literature. 39  These features
determine how Lochner translates into the First Amendment and when and if the
First Amendment has, in fact, been Lochnerized.
A. Enforcing non-textual rights
Lochnerism could entail an objection to judicial super-protection and
enforcement of unenumerated or nontextual rights to strike down popularly
enacted legislation. 4° This was the heart of John Hart Ely's critique of Roe v.
Wade,4' and indirectly of Lochner, from which Roe directly descended.42 Both
cases were grounded on non-textual substantive due process (whether property-
or liberty-based), judicially manufactured out of whole cloth and "not inferable
from the language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the
specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions they
included, or the nation's governmental structure. 43 The Court in both Lochner
and Roe accorded "unusual protection to those 'rights' that somehow seem most
pressing, regardless of whether the Constitution suggests any special solicitude
for them."44  The non-textual critique is particularly salient in the wake of
Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., which suggested the
propriety of more rigorous judicial review "when legislation appears on its face
37. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (Scalia, J.)
(describing jurisdiction as "a word of many, too many, meanings") (quoting United States v.
Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
38. See Richard A. Posner, Forward: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REv. 31, 54 n.74 (2005)
("[T]he term.., has become a portmanteau term of abuse for a decision that the abuser does not
like...").
39. See infra Part I.A-E.
40. See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 35 ("Critics argued that allowing courts to protect
unspecified rights under the Due Process Clause amounted to judicial usurpation."); Strauss,
Wrong, supra note 3, at 378-79 (describing the argument "that the Court erred in Lochner not by
enforcing constitutional rights, but by enforcing a right not found in the Constitution").
41. 410U.S. 113(1973).
42. See Ely, supra note 3, at 940 (suggesting that "Lochner and Roe are twins... [but] not
identical").
43. Id. at 935-36.
44. Id. at 939 (emphasis in original); see also Bernstein, supra note 2, at 56 ("For better or for
worse, Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)] and Roe's protection of the unenumerated
right to privacy raises many of the same issues as Lochner's protection of the unenumerated right to
liberty of contract."); Rebecca L. Brown, The Fragmented Liberty Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 65, 90 (1999) (arguing that the Court's mistake in substantive due process cases was its
decision to "fragment" liberty between personal and economic activity).
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to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such those of the first ten
Amendments."a5
Application of this feature of Lochner to the First Amendment is not readily
apparent. After all, there is an obvious textual commitment to the freedom of
speech. 6 For Ely, Roe was unique among Warren Court efforts to enforce ideals
of liberty, because other areas, including free speech, concerned rights based in
the text.47
But what we understand as First Amendment law is tied to the sparse (only
45 words) text and to the Framers only in the barest fashion. 8 Rather, First
Amendment doctrine and vigorous protection for the freedom of speech
developed in the evolutionary style of judicial common law lawmaking.4 9 Courts
devised rules based on prior precedents (including, and especially, the early
dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis).50 The Court establishes doctrine and
rules taking into express account concerns for policy, political morality, and
whether particular speech rules are sensible and produce fair results; rules are
not based on the text, the Framers, or the experiences of the founding
generation.1  In other words, First Amendment doctrine is the product of
constitutionalized (thus super-protected) common law judicial lawmaking that
trumps popular legislative enactments.52
Courts devised the specific content of free expression much as they
developed the specific content of the liberty of contract economic due process
45. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also Bernstein, supra note 2, at 52 (arguing that by
incorporating most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Court was able to continue
enforcement of fundamental rights against the states).
46. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
47. See Ely, supra note 3, at 943 (distinguishing Roe from other Warren Court decisions
because "by and large, it attempted to defend its decisions in terms of inferences from values the
Constitution marks as special" (emphasis omitted)).
48. Strauss, Common-Law Constitution, supra note 4, at 36 ("Neither the text nor the original
understandings provide much support for the principles of free expression that we today take for
granted."); see also id. at 40 ("[I]t is not obvious what constitutes 'the freedom of speech."').
49. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1405 (1986)
("The principle is rooted in the text of the Constitution itself, but it has been the decisions of the
Supreme Court over the last half century or so that have, in my view, nurtured that principle, given
it much of its present shape, and accounts for much of its energy and sweep.").
50. Strauss, Common-Law Constitution, supra note 4, at 47; see, e.g., Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
51. Strauss, Common-Law Constitution, supra note 4, at 44-45; id. at 47 ("[T]he text has been
incidental and the law has developed through precedent."); see also Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey
R. Stone, Dialogue, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 4, at 1, 1 ("Hundreds of judicial
decisions-minutely studied, analyzed, and criticized-now constitute a highly intricate body of
principles, doctrines, exceptions, and rationales.").
52. This contrasts with ordinary common law, which yields to superseding legislation, so long
as the legislature states its intent to override common law. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative
Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 705, 769 (2004) (describing the "fairly
obvious fact that the common law can be overridden by legislation," because "the common law
reflects a de facto legislative policy to leave certain fields of the law unplowed by legislation").
[Vol. 33:4
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rights at issue in Lochner.53  The fact that the First Amendment contains a
textual commitment to the freedom of speech perhaps explains our acceptance of
this review, distinguishing it from Roe and Lochner,54 but it does not necessarily
explain the meaning of the judicially enforced freedom of speech.
B. Lochner and the Institution of Judicial Review
The Lochnerian pejorative could challenge the entire institution of
individual-rights-based constitutional judicial review and judicial invalidation of
legislation duly enacted by the popularly elected branches. 5 The problem with
Lochner, this argument goes, was not constitutional review using non-textual
rights; the problem was constitutional review.56
Lochner, and the conventional distaste for Lochner, exemplifies the so-called
"counter-majoritarian difficulty," the problem of reconciling constitutional
review by unelected judges with democracy and democratic lawmaking.57
Critics harped, before and after Lochner, on judicial interference with the
popular will and failure to defer to majoritarian and legislative findings and
judgments.58 Lochnerian review was not law, but politics, they argued, because
judges should defer to legislative determinations when these determinations are
within reasonable range.59 Indeed, 1905 marked the beginning of one of the
most vocal periods of criticism "regarding the inconsistency of judicial review
with respect to democratic principles." 6
Recent efforts to rehabilitate Lochner spring from a desire to separate
doctrinal distaste for economic substantive due process from the structural need
for aggressive rights-based judicial review and more aggressive policing of
individual rights against infringing legislation. 61 Lochner and the decisions of its
53. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Cml. L. REv. 255, 264, 266-67 (1992)
(describing pre-New Deal development of substantive due process and arguing that our current
understanding of the First Amendment developed in a similar manner).
54. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
55. See Strauss, Wrong, supra note 3, at 376 ("Ihe project of identifying and elaborating
constitutional rights, and systematically applying them against legislative interference, was, one
might have thought, precisely what courts should not do.").
56. See id. (arguing that "one lesson of the Lochner era was that judicial review is
unacceptable unless it is confined to exceptional cases of government irrationality or
malfeasance").
57. See Friedman, supra note 10, at 1390; id. at 1402 ("What we have, then, is a fight about
legal legitimacy and its supposed consequences for judicial review.").
58. See id. at 1436-37.
59. See id. at 1454; see also Brown, supra note 44, at 81 (arguing that the government's
reasoning may be legitimately criticized on economic grounds; however, government explanations
typically are sufficient to justify limitations on liberty).
60. Friedman, supra note 10, at 1393.
61. Id. at 1400; see GiLMAN, supra note 26, at 205 (criticizing the use of Lochner as weapon
"against the modern Court's use of fundamental rights as a trump on government power"); Gary D.
Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 L. & Soc. INQUIRy 221, 242 (1999) ("By freeing us from
excessive worries about the legitimacy of judicial review, revisionism promises to direct our
2006]
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era reached incorrect conclusions, the argument goes, but those decisions were
the products of a structurally and procedurally proper and well-established
exercise of the judicial role in protecting individual rights against popular
legislation.62
Of course, constitutional judicial review has more than survived Lochner,
thus hostility to such review cannot be the heart of Lochnerism. 63  More
importantly, there has been the least structural controversy (as opposed to
substantive disagreement with particular decisions) over judicial review in the
First Amendment context: "Virtually everyone agrees that the courts should be
heavily involved in reviewing impediments to free speech . . . ,64
Commentators and critics rarely, if ever, question or challenge the structural
legitimacy of courts invalidating legislation on First Amendment grounds.65
This is so even as to decisions striking down wildly popular regulations of
unpopular expression.
66
This peculiar tolerance for First Amendment constitutionalism makes sense
on Ely's theory of judicial review, under which free expression must be
"strenuously" protected against majoritarian interference precisely "because
[free speech] is critical to the functioning of an open and effective democratic
society." 67 First Amendment doctrine historically rests on "unrelenting" distrust
attention to more fruitful and creative jurisprudential endeavors."); see also Strauss, Wrong, supra
note 3, at 378 ("[T]he willingness and ability of courts to take an aggressive role in enforcing
constitutional rights has become an entrenched aspect of the legal culture .... ).
62. See OwEN M. Fiss, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, 19 (1993)
("Lochner stands for both a distinctive body of constitutional doctrine and a distinctive conception
of judicial role: One could reject one facet of Lochner and accept the other."); Brown, supra note
44, at 83-84 (arguing that the departure from Lochner was not a departure from recognizing the
existence of economic due process, but a departure in applying the liberty principle in the face of
government conceptions of the common good); Ely, supra note 3, at 941 (arguing that Lochner
could be understood as asking the right question-whether the legislative action plausibly furthered
a permissible governmental goal-but misapplying the question and reaching the wrong
conclusion); Friedman, supra note 10, at 1401 ("[S]cholars argue that while the specific Lochner-
era holdings themselves were wrong . . . the tradition of upholding rights against popular
legislation was an established one.").
63. See Strauss, Wrong, supra note 3, at 376-77 (calling rigorous constitutional review one of
the "signal developments" in the last fifty years of constitutional law); id. at 378 (arguing that
"several decades of consensus in favor of much greater activism" means that arguments against
Lochner cannot rest on skepticism of the legitimacy and efficacy of judicial review).
64. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOcRAcY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 105 (1980);
id. at 116 ("'[S]trict review' is always appropriate where free expression is in issue.").
65. See Strauss, Wrong, supra note 3, at 377 (arguing that "no Justice-and seemingly hardly
anyone outside of academia-suggests that it is improper for the courts" to exercise rigorous First
Amendment review).
66. See, e.g., Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBLEMS 63, 66-67 (2004) (arguing that the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §
223 (2000), which sought to regulate internet pornography, was politically popular and on a
popularly important issue, yet the decision striking the law down did not upset the public).
67. ELY, supra note 64, at 105; see Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an
Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 256-57 ("[Tjhere are many forms of thought and expression
within the range of human communications from which the voter derives [ ] knowledge... These [
[Vol. 33:4
BARTNICKI As LOCHNER
of popular government and its ability and willingness to inhibit public debate in
service of its majoritarian interests.68 We accept that it falls to the insulated
courts to act as "special guardians of freedom of expression," 69 protecting public
discussion from self-interested, self-protecting, and untrustworthy, popular and
governmental majorities.70
C. Substituting Judicial for Legislative Judgment
Lochnerism is most commonly associated with the criticism that courts have,
in the guise of constitutional analysis, inappropriately substituted their own
views for the views of the legislature as to the merit, wisdom, efficacy, and
worthiness of public policy.7' Thus did Justice Black attempt to bury Lochner
in Ferguson v. Skrupa72 by insisting that "courts do not substitute their social
and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to
pass laws. 73 Courts would no longer "sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the
wisdom of legislation."
74
Rubenfeld emphasized this feature in criticizing the Lochnerian tendencies
of United States v. O'Brien.75 O'Brien involved the prosecution under a federal
statute prohibiting the intentional destruction of Selective Service registration
I must suffer no abridgement .. "); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:
The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1049, 1092-93 (2000) [hereinafter Volokh, Information Privacy] (arguing for protection of speech
on "daily life matters," the speech related to the "real, everyday experience of ordinary people,"
that deserves protection from government limitation).
68. Marvin Ammori, Another Worthy Tradition: How the Free Speech Curriculum Ignores
Electronic Media and Distorts Free Speech Doctrine, 70 Mo. L. REv. 59, 64-65 (2005).
69. Strauss, Wrong, supra note 3, at 377.
70. See AKmL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 242 (1998) ("[W]hen the central mission of
free speech shifted to protection of currently unpopular ideas from a current majority, an Article III
officer with life tenure, sheltered from current political winds and sensitive to the long-term value
of free speech, enjoyed certain advantages ..."); ELY, supra note 64, at 106 ("Courts must police
inhibitions on expression and other political activity because we cannot trust elected officials to do
so: ins have a way of wanting to make sure the outs stay out."); Fiss, supra note 49, at 1420
(agreeing that judges act as the ultimate guardians of First Amendment values because of their
independence of the forces dominating contemporary social structure).
71. See Balkin, Wrong, supra note 2, at 686 (describing the Lochner narrative of courts
"repeatedly overstep[ing] their appropriate roles as judges by reading their own political values into
the Constitution and second guessing the work of democratically elected legislatures and
democratically accountable executive officials"); Friedman, supra note 10, at 1385 (describing
Lochner as "symbolic of an era during which courts inappropriately substituted their views as to
proper social policy for those of representative assemblies"); id. ("Courts that appear to be
substituting their own view of desirable social policy for that of elected officials often are said to
Lochnerize."); Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 775 (condemning the "Lochner-like exercise in
constitutional review of a law's policy merits").
72. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
73. Id. at 730.
74. Id. at 731.
75. 391 U.S. 367 (1969); see Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 771.
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certificates of an individual who burned his card as a form of political protest. 76
The Supreme Court adopted a four-prong test for evaluating challenges such as
this one to laws of general applicability regulating conduct that could, in some
circumstances, be expressive or symbolic." The second prong of the O'Brien
test requires the court to determine whether the law at issue furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest.78
The problem, according to Rubenfeld, is that this prong leaves room for a
court to decide, in a form of "judicial superlegislative review," whether a
conduct regulation (a law that does not target speech) in fact furthers the stated
government interest. 79 He uses the example of an individual ticketed for
speeding who argues that he exceeded the speed limit for expressive purposes-
to protest and call attention to the stupidity of the new fifty five mile per hour
limit.80  The fact that the driver sought to present a particularized message
through his conduct places his case squarely within O'Brien, requiring a "full-
blown judicial determination" of whether the lower speed limit does (as the
government argued in enacting the law) increase fuel efficiency and highway
safety.8  This inquiry has the effect of "constitutionalizing a policy question of
purely legislative dimensions. 8 2  If the court agrees with the driver that the
lower speed limit does not achieve its intended goals, the speed limit will be
found unconstitutional simply because it is bad or ineffective in achieving its
policy objectives-precisely what Lochner is thought to be about. 3
76. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369-70.
77. Id. at 377:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
This is essentially the same test for content-neutral regulations, laws that directly regulate speech
(as opposed to conduct that may, or may not, be expressive), but apply regardless of the content or
message. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298, 299 n.8 (1984)
(stating the constitutional test for content-neutral restriction is "little, if any, different" from the test
for regulations of expressive conduct); Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 785; Smolla, supra note 15, at
1125 (calling O'Brien the "close cousin" of the intermediate scrutiny standard for content-neutral
regulations); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 615, 653 (1991) ("[Tlhe Court has collapsed the [time, place, and manner] and symbolic
speech doctrines into a single, rather weak, standard.").
78. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
79. Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 771.
80. Id. Rubenfeld further develops the hypothetical by adding the fact that the
speeder/speaker's car bears a sign reading "If you see me driving at 65, it means I'm protesting the
55-mile-per-hour speed limit." Id. at 774.
81. Id.at771,775.
82. Id. at 771.
83. Id. at 775.
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This feature of Lochner does not get us very far analytically because it really
depends on one's biased perspective whether a court in a given case applied
good-faith legal analysis or superimposed its own judgments on the legislature. 84
Ultimately, it breaks out into a broader critique of all balancing in constitutional
analysis.85 Many Lochner-era decisions were derided simply as judicial re-
balancing of interests, a re-measuring of the legislature's conclusion that a
particular regulation of business served the public or common good.86 Congress
already had struck the balance among competing interests in drafting the law; the
Court should not re-do that balance.87  Moreover, Lochner-era critics saw
judicial balancing as arbitrary, random, unpredictable, and ultimately political,
with results varying widely among cases.88
But such balancing is uniquely prevalent under the First Amendment.
Indeed, it seems unavoidable unless the language of the First Amendment-
"Congress shall make no law"-is taken as an absolute bar to the regulation of
all that could be expressive.89 Such absolutism is precisely where Rubenfeld
hopes to go.9° He argues for a new "purposivist" approach to free speech: the
First Amendment is, per se, violated when the immediate purpose of a law is to
target speech or to punish someone for speaking; it is, per se, not violated if the
government's purpose was to target something other than speech or if the person
was not punished for speaking.91 Under this approach, there would be no
balancing of interests, means, or ends.92
84. See Ely, supra note 3, at 940 ("All the 'superimposition of the Court's own value choices'
talk is, of course, the characterization of others and not the language of Lochner or its progeny.").
85. See Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 786 (arguing that balancing's inquiry into "how well a
law furthers important governmental interests becomes nothing more than superlegislative judicial
review of the law's policy merits").
86. Compare Bernstein, supra note 2, at 12-13 (discussing conclusions that legislation that
merely shifted resources could not be regarded as beneficial to the public) and Brown, supra note
44, at 82 (arguing that the move from Lochner reflected "changes in the understanding of what
constituted a valid public purpose of government") with Cushman, supra note 33, at 899
(discussing cases striking down business regulations because the business was not affected with the
public interest, thus its regulation could not be in service of the public good).
87. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
88. See Friedman, supra note 10, at 1406.
89. See OWEN M. FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 5 (1996) [hereinafter Fiss, IRONY] (arguing
that the Supreme Court has not interpreted the First Amendment as a bar to all state regulation;
instead, the Court has interpreted the First Amendment as a mandate to reign in the state's authority
by balancing the value of the speech with the state's advanced interest in regulating); MARTIN H.
REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYsIs 54 (1984) ("[A]ny general rule of first
amendment interpretation that chooses not to afford absolute protection to speech because of
competing social concerns is, in reality, a form of balancing."); but see Edmond Cahn, Justice
Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 553 (1962)
(interviewing Justice Black, who described his view of the First Amendment as "'no law' means
no law").
90. See Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 776.
91. See id. Rubenfeld distinguishes purpose from motive and focuses only on the former. Id.
at 793-94. Purposivism looks to the immediate action of the law and whether it targets speech;
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Unless the Court adopts the absolutist interpretation, there must be
consideration and balancing of the means and ends employed by government and
the tailoring between the two where speech is involved-whether a given law is
necessary to serve an interest and whether that interest is, on balance,
sufficiently important to justify the disfavored legislative act of restricting
speech.93 The charge of First Amendment Lochnerism perhaps derives because
the balance so often tilts in favor of protecting expression and against the
asserted legislative interests. 94 But the alternative is for courts to analyze the
threat posed by the particular speech at issue-an approach that places courts in
the similarly questionable position of judging the value or worth of particular
expression.95 That focus would not guard effectively against courts getting
swept up in the concerns that motivated the legislators to act to restrain
particular speech in the first instance.96
D. Misallocating Rigorous Judicial Scrutiny
Lochnerian courts allegedly aim (or misaim) rigorous judicial scrutiny at the
wrong targets. 97 Lochner-era courts reviewed ordinary social, economic, and
commercial regulation that should not have warranted heightened (if any)
constitutional review, ultimately removing much economic regulation from the
legislative purview.98 The defeat of Lochner in 1937 through the Supreme
Court's famous "Switch in Time" 99 reflected a new constitutional understanding:
motive or further purpose (what the legislature ultimately hopes to achieve as a matter of public
policy beyond simply regulating speech) is irrelevant. See id.
92. See id. at 779 ("A purposivist view of the First Amendment does not involve balancing.
It is absolute." (emphasis in original)).
93. ELY, supra note 64, at 105-06; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 786 (arguing that
narrow-tailoring requirements may be useful as a way to uncover impermissible motive).
94. See REDISH, supra note 89, at 55 (arguing for balancing with a "thumb on the scales" in
favor of free speech); Schauer, supra note 4, at 192 ("[T]he fact that the First Amendment is the
authority of choice.., says a great deal about the way in which the First Amendment functions in
American society .... ); Wasserman, supra note 4, at 382 ("Freedom of speech frequently trumps
other societal and constitutional values .... ").
95. See FCC v. Pacific Found., Inc., 438 U.S. 726, 761 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) ("I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are
free generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the First Amendment
is most 'valuable' and hence deserving of the most protection, and which is less 'valuable' and
hence deserving of less protection."); Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 823 ("The freedom of speech, as
we actually know it and have it in this country, is irreconcilable with high-value/low-value
thinking."); id. at 824 (arguing that the First Amendment forbids governmental actors from
declaring an opinion to be of low value).
96. ELY, supra note 64, at 107.
97. See Balkin, Wrong, supra note 2, at 686.
98. Id.; Richards, supra note 3, at 1213 (arguing that Lochner's theory "seek[s] to place
certain forms of economic regulation beyond the power of legislatures to enact"); see also
Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 778 (arguing that individuals should have no First Amendment claims
when they violate ordinary prohibitory laws).
99. See 2 AcKERMAN, supra note 35, at 262, 290-91 (describing the "switch in time" by two
centrist justices to endorse the New Deal by upholding legislation, as "the result of the law working
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legislatures should have power in particular regulatory areas and reviewing
courts would accord greater deference to political branches and less rigorous
review where economic, commercial, and business matters were concerned.' °l
As the Carolene Products Court said in the text just before Footnote Four:
the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light
of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character
as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis
within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
10 1
On this view, the problem with Lochner was the application of rigorous
judicial scrutiny to, and potential invalidation of, such economic legislation,
even if most in fact survived review. 10 2 Similarly, Rubenfeld recognizes that
courts do not use O'Brien to engage in the feared superlegislative review of the
wisdom and merits of speed limits or other generally applicable conduct laws
absent some indication "of an improper speech-suppressing purpose."' 0 3 For
Rubenfeld, however, that simply drives the point that a "profound rethinking" of
First Amendment law and a move away from balancing is doctrinally
necessary.l°4
The concept of according more or less constitutional scrutiny to particular
categories of laws finds its First Amendment analogue in the content distinction,
the differential treatment of content-based and content-neutral laws that is a
cornerstone of modem free speech doctrine. 10 5  Content-based regulations
restrict speech because of the substance, message, ideas, subject matter, or
itself pure"); Schauer, supra note 4, at 178 ("Halfway through the New Deal the Supreme Court
changed its mind (or at least its tune), and things have never been the same.").
100. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 401 ("When the New Deal Court repudiated Lochner
after 1937, it was repudiating market freedom as an ultimate constitutional value, and declaring
that, henceforth, economic regulation would be treated as a utilitarian question of social
engineering."); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 389 (1990) [hereinafter Balkin, Realism] ("[i1t was thought that
issues of economic freedom should be left to legislatures and administrative agencies, who could
study these matters in their larger social context and determine the allocation of rights and duties
that best served the public interest."); Schauer, supra note 4, at 178 ("[T]he Court . . . has
continued to uphold most forms of social and economic regulation against libertarian objections,
concluding that with respect to such matters it was the place neither of the comparatively
unchangeable Constitution nor of the unelected federal courts to interfere ... .
101. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152.
102. See Brown, supra note 44, at 86-87 (arguing that far more legislation was upheld in the
face of economic due process challenge than was struck down); but see Friedman, supra note 10, at
1449 (arguing that the "small absolute number of overrulings looked like a sea change to observers
living at the time").
103. Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 787.
104. Id. ("[W]hen the purposivism instinct in First Amendment law is taken seriously-a
profound rethinking of a number of First Amendment issues becomes possible.").
105. See Bollinger & Stone, supra note 51, at 19; Williams, supra note 77, at 617 (describing
the "growing focus on content discrimination as the central concern of the first amendment").
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speakers involved, or because of the effect of the expression on the audience.' °6
Content-neutral laws apply to all speech, regardless of subject matter, speaker, or
point of view, and are justified or explained without regard to the substance of
the speech regulated. 10 7  Content-based regulations can be further divided
between those that discriminate based on viewpoint-regulating one particular
point of view on a subject while leaving other viewpoints on that subject
unregulated-and on content or the subject matter of speech-regulating the
overall topic, subject, or issue discussed or the category of speakers involved.10 8
The First Amendment also could be implicated by neutral laws of general
applicability, laws that do not regulate speech in any sense, instead targeting
conduct or other behavior that may involve language or that may be performed
for expressive purposes.'
9
The continuum of content connection leads to a continuum of constitutional
scrutiny. Viewpoint-discriminatory laws are virtually per se unconstitutional." 0
Content-based laws are subject to highly rigorous (and rarely satisfied) strict or
exacting scrutiny, requiring that the law be the least restrictive means to serve a
compelling government interest."' Content-neutral laws are subject to
106. See Bollinger & Stone, supra note 51, at 19 ("A content-based regulation restricts speech
because of its message..."); Smolla, supra note 15, at 1123 (arguing that law appears content-
based when the regulation "must at least to some degree reflect something in the nature of a
content-based judgment about the speech"); Williams, supra note 77, at 622-23 ("[A] regulation
will qualify as content discriminatory only if the government purpose served by the regulation is
related to the content of the speech."); see also, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 811-12 (2000); Forsythe County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134
(1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991);
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
107. See Bollinger & Stone, supra note 51, at 19; Strauss, Common-Law Constitution, supra
note 4, at 38 (describing regulations directed at speech but not based on the content of the speech
regulated); see also, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994)
[hereinafter Turner 1] ("[L]aws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference
to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral."); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293)) (stating that laws are content-neutral when "justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech"); id. at 791 (stating the issue as "whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys").
108. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(calling viewpoint discrimination "an egregious form of content discrimination"); Smolla, supra
note 15, at 1121 ("Viewpoint discrimination, at its worst, involves deliberate suppression of
particular views..."); Williams, supra note 77, at 655 (calling viewpoint discrimination "the most
biased end of the continuum ... where the government singles out and disadvantages one view on
a subject while leaving other points of view untouched"); see also Smolla, supra note 15, at 1122
("While all laws that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint automatically discriminate on the basis
of content, not all laws that discriminate on the basis of content go so far as to single out disfavored
viewpoints.").
109. See Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 770-71; Smolla, supra note 15, at 1119-20; Strauss,
Common-Law Constitution, supra note 4, at 38.
110. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1122.
111. See Playboy Entm't, 529 U.S. at 813; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; Simon & Schuster,
502 U.S. at 116; see also Smolla, supra note 15, at 1122 (describing strict scrutiny as "highly
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intermediate scrutiny, a less demanding and "more open-ended 'balancing"'
test 12 that weighs a law's restrictiveness against the government's important or
substantial justifications for the law and overwhelmingly strikes the balance in
favor of constitutionality." 3 The difference in the forms of scrutiny, and thus the
likely result of the balancing, turns on the degree of exactingness that the court
demands in the fit between the law and the legislative goal.14
This difference in scrutiny is justified on the theory that the more content (or
viewpoint) plays a role in the application of or justification for a law, the more
the law looks like governmental censorship or governmental manipulation of
public debate, thus the greater the harm to free-speech values." 15 In Smolla's
words, "[i]t is not that content-based regulation of speech is inherently despotic,
but that it inherently lends itself to despotism."' '16  The great threat to free-
speech values is governmental manipulation or control of debate by controlling
messages or points of view or the anticipated effects if the audience hears and is
persuaded by some expression. 1t7
And the difference functions quite sharply in practice, perhaps (silently) to
preempt charges of First Amendment Lochnerism. Few, if any, content-based
laws survive the "acid baths" of strict scrutiny." 8  Nearly all content-neutral
regulations survive less-rigorous intermediate review.19
demanding, but not absolute"); Strauss, Common-Law Constitution, supra note 4, at 38 (arguing
that content-based regulations are presumptively unconstitutional).
112. Bollinger & Stone, supra note 51, at 20.
113. See id.; Smolla, supra note 15, at 1125; see also Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662 (citing
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377); Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-800 (requiring that the law be narrowly tailored,
although not necessarily the least restrictive means, to serve a significant government interest while
leaving open ample alternative channels of communication).
114. See Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 785.
115. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1121-22 (describing viewpoint discrimination as
"tantamount to thought control"); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 198-99 (1983) (arguing that the community though
process is distorted and manipulated when government eliminates particular ideas, viewpoints, or
information from the public debate); see also Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116 (stating that "the
government's ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the
government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace"); but see
REDISH, supra note 89, at 104 (arguing that content-neutral regulations diminish the value of free
speech and questioning the differential standards of review).
116. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1122; see City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[C]ontent-based speech restrictions are especially likely to be
improper attempts to value some forms of speech over others, or are particularly susceptible to
being used by the government to distort public debate.").
117. See Stone, supra note 115, at 198-99; David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and
Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 355 (1991) (arguing that the First Amendment
prohibits government from attempting to control the audience's mental processes by deliberately
denying them information in order to induce certain behavior).
118. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1122; see REDISH, supra note 89, at 118-19; Heidi Kitrosser,
From Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative Manner and the First
Amendment, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1339, 1393 (2002); Stone, supra note 115, at 196. Ironically, the
exception is in those areas of First Amendment law that commentators fear may or have become
Lochnerized. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding, as against strict
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E. Lochner as Political Symbol: "Nine Old Men" and "Switch in Time"
Finally, Lochner is a political and ideological morality play. It is the
narrative of the Nine Old Men and the Switch in Time. 20 It is the collision
between old-guard judges enforcing their outmoded world views as matters of
constitutional law and elected officials putting into play popular new progressive
ideas then in social ascension, with the latter eventually prevailing. 12'
Lochnerian judges imposed their anti-Progressive biases-pro-business, anti-
labor, libertarian, laissez-faire economics-to strike down, as unconstitutional,
popular attempts to change, and ultimately level, the social and economic
playing field. 22 Lochnerism is the last judicial stand of the old constitutional
order against new legislative initiatives. 123 Lochner was the old, rigid, formalist
regime that had to be slain in order for the progressive, flexible, pragmatic ideals
of the New Deal to spread and take hold. 24 The New Deal's turn from Lochner
reflected eventual judicial recognition of changed social and economic
conditions that altered the understanding of the common good, the role of
government in ensuring the public good, and when constitutional liberty must
yield to the common good. 1
25
scrutiny, limitations on campaign contributions and expenditures); Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1989) (same as to restrictions on corporate expenditures).
119. See REDISH, supra note 89, at 99 (describing the Court's "ambivalence" towards content-
neutral restrictions); Kitrosser, supra note 118, at 1393 (describing criticism that courts give a
"veritable 'pass' to regulations deemed content-neutral"); see also, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II]; Ward, 491 U.S. at 796; see infra
note 201-209 and accompanying text.
120. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 290-91 (describing the "switch in time" by two
centrist justices to endorse the New Deal); Bernstein, supra note 2, at 4 (describing view of "the
heroic Franklin Roosevelt [standing] up to the Nine Old Men" of the Supreme Court in securing
the New Deal).
121. See Balkin, Wrong, supra note 2, at 685 ("Following the struggle over the New Deal and
the ascendancy of the Roosevelt Court, Lochner symbolized the constitutional regime that had just
been overthrown."); see also Bernstein, supra note 2, at 4 ("This morality tale bore only a modest
relation to reality. However, it suited the political needs of the Progressive and New Deal era
controversialists who initially wove it.").
122. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 257 ("Lochner became the symbol of a repudiated era
of laissez-faire jurisprudence."); Bernstein, supra note 2, at 2 (outlining the view that "Lochner era
Supreme Court Justices, influenced by pernicious Social Darwinist ideology, sought to impose
their laissez-faire views on the American polity."); Cushman, supra note 33, at 983 (describing this
as the "narrow" view of Lochner); Friedman, supra note 10, at 1452 (discussing the perception of
Lochner-era judges motivated by class bias); Richards, supra note 3, at 1212; Schauer, supra note
4, at 178 (arguing that the Court "[c]ast[] aside the view that the Constitution adopted a libertarian
or laissez-faire view of economics").
123. See Balkin, Wrong, supra note 2, at 686.
124. Id.; see 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 401 ("When the New Deal Court repudiated
Lochner after 1937, it was repudiating market freedom as an ultimate constitutional value .... ").
125. See Brown, supra note 44, at 83-84 ("By [1937], the suffering of workers and the changes
in the economic and social order had persuaded many that liberty was not protected adequately
without regulation'..."); id. at 87 (arguing that government sometimes convinced Lochner-era
judges that some restriction on economic liberty was in the common good); Strauss, Wrong, supra
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The Lochner-as-politics critique further entails what Jack Balkin calls
"ideological drift" in constitutional principle, through which radical and
progressive constitutional ideas gain acceptance, ultimately become orthodoxy,
then are adopted (or co-opted, depending on one's point of view) by the other
side of the ideological constitutional divide as arguments for preserving the
status quo. 126 The constitutional laissez-faire economic arguments that were the
bane of New Deal Democrats and Lochner-era Progressives originated as
antebellum liberal arguments against the provision of government benefits (such
as the advantages of the newly created corporate form) to monied interests; the
arguments only later were picked up by big business as a way of fending off
government regulation, while the progressive left committed itself to
redistributive social and economic regulation. 1
27
Ironically, the death of Lochner helped create this feature of First
Amendment Lochnerism. Faced with the loss of viable libertarian economic
arguments against government regulation, business and conservative interests
turned to the First Amendment and to the historically libertarian free speech
tradition of the left. 128 That, in turn, cast the First Amendment ideologically
adrift. The political left now holds dear and supports the counter values the
legislature often asserts to justify some restrictions on speech-equality,
democracy, personal privacy-as uniquely compelling values that at times
should outweigh free speech. 129  Moreover, the political left's substantive
commitment to redistributive economics is incompatible with broad libertarian
protection for conservative-leaning contrary expression by large, monied
corporate and business interests.'
30
note 3, at 386 (arguing that the problem was the Lochner Court's failure to recognize that other
concerns could outweigh liberty of contract).
126. Balkin, Realism, supra note 100, at 383.
127. Id. at 383-84.
128. See id. at 384 ("Business interests and other conservative groups are finding that
arguments for property rights and the status quo can more and more easily be rephrased in the
language of the first amendment by using the very same absolutist forms of argument offered by the
left in previous generations."); Schauer, supra note 4, at 178 ("Facing the increasing constitutional
(or at least doctrinal) weakness of arguments from economic libertarianism, economic libertarians
turned their attention to the First Amendment.").
129. See Fiss, IRoNY, supra note 89, at 9-10; id. at 83 ("The autonomy protected by the First
Amendment and rightly enjoyed by individuals and the press is not an end in itself,... but is rather
a means to further the democratic values underlying the Bill of Rights."); Balkin, Realism, supra
note 100, at 423 (describing conflicts between egalitarianism and the requirement of governmental
content-neutrality in regulating speech).
130. See Martin H. Redish and Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 235, 291 (1998)
("But it is probably accurate often enough to treat corporate speech as the rough equivalent of
something approaching more politically conservative free market advocacy. If such is the case,
however, then attempts to exclude corporate speech from the First Amendment's scope are similarly
likely to represent the rough equivalent of burdening only one substantive political-economic
position.").
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We find ourselves in the First Amendment equivalent of 1936.' 3' Both
constitutional conflicts arise out of similar social contexts: New Deal legislation
and recent speech-restrictive legislation (such as the wiretap law at issue in
Bartnicki) both are born "of the economic and social dislocations caused by
rapid technological change."' 132 Popular government seeks to deal with these
upheavals through legislation and the courts are forced to fit this legislation into
existing doctrinal frameworks. 133  Lochner-era courts continued to broadly
protect economic liberty from government regulation, not yet embracing the
"irony" urged from the left that the failure of government to act in the economic
sphere was harmful to the public good. 34 Similarly, the Court today (call them
the "Eight Middle-Aged-to-Old Men and One Older Woman") continues to
apply broad First Amendment principles created in an earlier era to strike down
government regulation, not yet embracing the paradox suggested by many that
the state can be "a friend of speech" and can, through regulation of speech,
enhance democracy and democratic ideals.
35
With few exceptions, free speech principles do not yet yieldin court to other
liberal values that popular government may seek to protect through limits on
expression-much as freedom of contract did not yield prior to 1937. Neil
Richards argues that to invalidate laws protecting privacy in consumer credit
data and information would mark a descent into First Amendment
Lochnerism. 36  According to Richards, Lochner and the First Amendment
arguments against information-privacy rules share an unnecessary (and
unwanted) "libertarian gloss upon the Constitution," placing economic
regulation beyond the reach of the ordinary legislative process in a way favored
by business interests.
1 37
Broad protection for free speech may be perceived as the old constitutional
order, judicially enforced and resistant to calls for greater protection of privacy
and personal dignity as a different, worthy legal value that popular branches of
government may proactively protect. 38 And we see a political valence similar to
131. See infra notes 132-142 and accompanying text.
132. Richards, supra note 3, at 1213.
133. See Friedman, supra note 10, at 1397 (discussing arguments that Lochner-era decisions
were grounded in and faithful to existing doctrine).
134. See Brown, supra note 44, at 83-84.
135. Fiss, IRONY, supra note 89, at 83; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Future of Free Speech,
in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 4, 285, 304 (arguing that a belief in the democratic
foundations of the free speech principle means that some government regulation of speech is not
problematic if it is a reasonable effort to promote democratic goals).
136. See Richards, supra note 3, at 1212-13 ("[Tjhere are some fairly strong parallels between
the traditional conception of Lochner and the First Amendment critique of data privacy
legislation.").
137. Id. at 1213; id. at 1215 ("[T11he modern normative commitment against placing social and
economic problems beyond the reach of democratic regulatory politics would still counsel against
taking the First Amendment critique at face value.").
138. See Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of
the Internet, 34 SAN DmoO L. REv. 1153, 1155 (1997) (calling on government to "guarantee
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the period before Lochner's demise, with the left seeking to limit the dominant,
libertarian constitutional value in the face of these countervailing interests.
39
Initial calls for restrictions on speech as a way to protect and preserve other
values, such as equality, individual dignity, and individual self-worth, came from
the left.140 This old regime rests on an assumption that government may not
decide what speech is unfair, excessive, intolerable, or in bad taste and that
granting government that power necessarily creates the potential for abuse.
14 1
The new constitutional order hopes government can and will legislate in favor of
privacy and other interests, even at the risk of creating new, but justified, free
speech restrictions. 1
42
II. LOCHNER AND BARTNICKI
A. Bartnicki Considered
In 1968, as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
Congress sought to prohibit and punish particular private conduct: wiretapping
and intercepting wire and voice (expanded in 1986 to include electronic)
communications. 43  The statute prohibited the willful interception of
communications, 144 the use of devices designed to intercept communications,
1 45
the use of the contents of illegally intercepted communications, 146 and the
intentional disclosure of the contents of a communication knowing or having
reason to know the information was obtained through an unlawful
interception. 47  The law was enforceable through a private civil action for
individuals the right to control ... their personal information"); Smolla, supra note 15, at 1150
("Upholding a restriction on privacy contraband, however, merely permits the government to come
to the aid of a speaker ... who does not wish to have his views involuntarily exposed from having
those views forcibly stolen and disseminated.").
139. Balkin, Realism, supra note 100, at 376 ("The left in the United States used to be solidly
united around the overriding importance of protecting speech from governmental interference...
It's not that way anymore.").
140. See Fiss, IRONY, supra note 89, at 10 (arguing that "many liberals find it difficult to
choose freedom of speech over the countervalues being threatened," when the state "exercises...
power on behalf of another of liberalism's defining goals---equality").
141. See Volokh, Information Privacy, supra note 67, at 1116; see also Ammori, supra note
68, at 64-65 (arguing that different speech traditions apply to different circumstances, divided by
the prevalence of an "unrelenting government distrust"); Smolla, supra note 15, at 1122 ("It is not
that content-based regulation of speech is inherently despotic, but that it inherently lends itself to
despotism...").
142. See Volokh, Information Privacy, supra note 67, at 1106.
143. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
211 (1968), as amended by Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (1986); see also Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 523-24; Smolla, supra note 15, at 1100-01.
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000).
145. Id. § 2511(1)(b).
146. Id. § 2511(1)(d).
147. Id. § 2511(1)(c).
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equitable relief, actual, statutory, and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. 148
Congress' explicit purpose was to protect personal privacy in burgeoning wire
and electronic communications against surreptitious eavesdropping. 149 The law
reflects an effort by Congress to get ahead of technology in protecting personal,
business, and other privacy interests against unwanted intrusion. 50 As Rodney
Smolla argues:
Congress clearly understood that new communications technologies
would often supplement, if not largely supplant, many traditional forms
of communication . . . forms of communication that historically
promised a reasonably strong degree of privacy protection. Congress
plainly thought it was important to attempt to secure some rough
measure of equivalent privacy for these new modes of communication,
and for new forms that would undoubtedly develop in the future, given
our modem culture's ever-accelerating arc of invention.
151
Throughout 1992 and 1993, a high-profile and highly contentious labor
dispute raged between the Pennsylvania State Education Association and the
school board governing Wyoming Valley West High School in north-central
Pennsylvania. 152 In May 1993, Anthony Kane, a teacher in the district and the
president of the local union, had a telephone conversation with Gloria Bartnicki,
the union's chief negotiator; Kane spoke on his land line while Bartnicki spoke
from her cellular phone. 53 The conversation about the labor dispute, the school
board, and the current status of negotiations was, in Smolla's words, "candid,
and included some blunt down-and-dirty characterizations of their opponents in
the labor controversy, at times getting personal."'' 54 The conversation eventually
turned to the school board's media-reported bargaining position of refusing any
pay increase greater than three percent, of which Kane said "If they're not gonna
148. Id. § 2520(a), (b).
149. See e.g., S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 66 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2153 (describing statutory purpose as "protecting the privacy" of wire and oral communication); id.
at 67 ("Every spoken word relating to each man's personal, marital, religious, political, or
commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to the
auditor's advantage."); Oversight on Communications Privacy: Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights, and Trademarks, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1-2 (1984)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (discussing the impact of new electronic communications "on our lives
and our sense of privacy").
150. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1102-03 ("There is indeed a whole lot a scannin' goin' [sic] on.
People surreptitiously intercept, record, and disclose the usual suspects for the usual reasons, in the
perpetual parade of human perfidy.").
151. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1102-03 (footnotes omitted).
152. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
153. Id.; Smolla, supra note 15, at 1112.
154. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1112.
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move for three percent, we're gonna have to go to their, their homes... To blow
off their front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those guys.' 55
The telephone call was intercepted by an unknown individual and recorded
onto a cassette tape. 156  The tape was passed anonymously to Jack Yocum,
president of a local taxpayers' organization that had actively supported the board
and opposed the union's positions in the dispute. 157 Yocum passed the tape to
Frederick Vopper, who hosted a radio talk show under the pseudonym "Fred
Williams," who repeatedly played the tape on the air.158 Other media outlets,
some of which had received anonymous copies of the tape, then similarly
published the contents of the cassette.
1 59
Bartnicki and Kane sued Vopper and Yocum for actual, statutory, and
punitive damages and attorney's fees under the disclosure provision of the
federal wiretap law and a separate state law. 6° Vopper and Yocum argued that
the First Amendment precluded their liability under these circumstances 161 and
six justices, led by Justice Stevens, agreed. 162 Justice Stevens held that the case
was controlled by the principle of Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 163 that "if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of
the information, absent a need ... of the highest order. ' 164 The basic elements of
that test were satisfied: neither Yocum, Vopper, nor any other media member
played a role in the initial unlawful interception of the Kane-Bartnicki call; all
obtained the information lawfully; and the subject matter of the conversation-
the labor dispute and negotiations and everything surrounding that-was a
matter of public concern. 
165
Justice Stevens reaffirmed the Court's ongoing refusal to declare
categorically whether publication of truthful information ever could be
punished.' 66  Nevertheless, he soundly rejected the government's asserted
interests in stopping interception and in protecting the personal privacy of those
engaged in these conversations. 167 While recognizing that the latter interest was
155. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518-19; Smolla, supra note 15, at 1113; see also id. at 1144
(arguing that "[i]t was The Sopranos talk of blowing off porches and 'dojing] some work on some
of these guys' (or 'dese guys')" that influenced several justices in the case).
156. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519.
157. Id.
158. Id.; Smolla, supra note 15, at 1113 n.54.
159. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518-19; Smolla, supra note 15, at 1113.
160. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519-20 n.3.
161. Id. at 520.
162. Id. at 516.
163. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
164. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-28 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
165. Barinicki, 532 U.S. at 525; Smolla, supra note 15, at 1116-17; but see id. at 1150
(criticizing the "sweeping version" of public concern used by Justice Stevens).
166. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989));
Richards, supra note 3, at 1199.
167. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529-34.
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strong, Stevens stated that those "concerns gave way when balanced against the
interest in publishing matters of public importance," the sort of truthful
information at the core of First Amendment protection.68
Justices Breyer and O'Connor nominally joined Justice Stevens' opinion,
creating an apparent majority. 169 But Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion
that, in tone and language, was narrower and appeared to take a distinct path to
the conclusion that the expression in the instant case was protected, a path that
leaves expression less thoroughly protected in the face of privacy concerns. i70
Justice Breyer emphasized the "special circumstances" inhering in publication of
intercepted information "involv[ing] a matter of unusual public concern," in this
case, a genuine true threat of physical harm to person and property.17 1 He
concluded that Bartnicki and Kane "had little or no legitimate interest in
maintaining the privacy" of such threats. 172 Moreover as limited public figures
for purposes of the labor dispute, Bartnicki and Kane had forfeited some of their
interests in privacy. 173 Justice Breyer took pains to agree with Justice Stevens
that § 251 1(1)(c) is unconstitutional only as applied to the facts, refusing to
extend the ruling beyond present circumstances. 1
74
B. A Lochnerian Spin on Bartnicki
Bartnicki is Lochner in one sense of the word: the Court reviewed and
invalidated federal legislation on constitutional grounds. 75  If one sees
Lochnerism in all individual rights-based judicial review, Bartnicki obviously
fits the mold - as does every other major First Amendment case. Bartnicki also
reflects, in the First Amendment realm, several of the other, more nuanced
elements frequently associated with the purported evils of Lochnerism. 176 If we
are going to speak of First Amendment Lochnerism, Bartnicki remains a good
illustration of the purported problems.
168. See id. at 532-34.
169. Id. at 535.
170. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1113 (discussing narrower scope of Breyer's concurring
opinion).
171. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., concurring); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40
Hous. L. REv. 697, 743 (2003) [hereinafter Volokh, Intellectual Property]; see also Smolla, supra
note 15, at 1144 (arguing that Breyer "seemed offended by the conversation," treating it as an
authentic discussion of the need to engage in violence, rather than a hyperbolic discussion of anger
at the school board's negotiating intransigence).
172. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
173. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
175. See supra Part I.B.
176. See supra Parts I.C-E.
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1. Rigorous review of inappropriate targets
Bartnicki aimed rigorous (and ultimately disqualifying) First Amendment
review at what appears to be the type of law that ordinarily should not receive
such close scrutiny. "Appears" is the operative word, of course, because the
type of law at issue and level of review are the most confused aspects of the
main opinion.
Justice Stevens initially described § 2511(1)(c) as a "content-neutral law of
general applicability."'1 This description fuses two distinct types of laws-laws
of general applicability that do not regulate speech but instead regulate
conduct,178 and laws that regulate pure speech without regard to the content of
the speech regulated. 79  This confused description points to the Court's
uncertainty in characterizing the disclosure provision. 8° On one hand, §
2511(1)(c) was not a stand-alone restriction, but a supplement to the broader
prohibition on interception, the latter obviously a law of general applicability
regulating not speech but conduct.'8 1 Alternatively, an argument could be made
that Congress' decision to prohibit dissemination of intercepted communications
was grounded in discomfort with the substance or content of what would be
revealed in a private conversation, a somewhat-content-based judgment
underlying the law.
182
The third, and best, description of § 2511(1)(c) is a content-neutral
regulation of expression. 83 The law was "fairly characterized as a regulation of
pure speech," since it prohibits the publication of information, but one that
applied regardless of the substance or content of the conversation disclosed and
was justified by a government interest in protecting the privacy interests of those
in the conversation without reference to their content.'14 The prohibition turned
on the source of the communication, on the fact that the conversation had been
177. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526.
178. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1119-20; Strauss, Common-Law Constitution, supra note 4, at
38.
179. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1123; Strauss, Common-Law Constitution, supra note 4, at 38;
supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
180. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526-27 (finding that § 2511 (1)(c) "is fairly characterized as a
regulation of pure speech" after concluding that § 251 1(1)(c) is a "content-neutral law of general
applicability").
181. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l); infra notes 210-227 and accompanying text.
182. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1123 ("[Tjhe widespread repugnance in our society for
trafficking in such privacy contraband is at least to some degree bound up in repugnance for the
open airing of the content of what was intercepted."); see also Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527 n. 11
("[Wihat gave rise to statutory liability in this suit was the information communicated on the
tapes.") (citing Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting)).
183. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1123.
184. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526-27; Smolla, supra note 15, at 1122.
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intercepted and recorded unlawfully, rather than the conversation's subject
matter. 1
8 5
Such a content-neutral regulation of pure speech ordinarily should be subject
to intermediate scrutiny. 186  Justice Breyer's concurring opinion insisted that
intermediate scrutiny was necessary and that strict scrutiny was inappropriate.
187
Chief Justice Rehnquist similarly emphasized in dissent that intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate. 188  One thus could conclude, as Smolla does after
reconstructing the majority opinion in light of the concurring and dissenting
opinions, that a majority of five Justices (the two concurring justices and the
three dissenters) did agree that the law was subject to intermediate review (even
if they disagreed how to apply that scrutiny).' 89
But Justice Stevens himself never identified the standard of review he was
applying.' 90 Justice Breyer, who purported to join Justice Stevens's opinion,
never disavowed that failure.' 91 And the dissent's point of departure is its view
that the majority had, sub silentio, subjected the law to the strict scrutiny not
normally appropriate for such a law.
192
Bartnicki took its Lochnerian turn when Justice Stevens avoided content
scrutiny and the standards of review altogether. 193 In doing so, he invoked a
freestanding doctrinal line distinct from ordinary content analysis. 94 But his
application of Daily Mail nevertheless is unique.
Bartnicki is the first, and thus far only, time that Daily Mail had been
applied to a content-neutral regulation; prior cases had applied the principle to
laws that obviously targeted particular expressive content. 95  Daily Mail
185. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526; Smolla, supra note 15, at 1122-23.
186. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1123 (arguing that intermediate scrutiny exists for a law
such as § 2511(1)(c), which is not sufficiently content-based to warrant strict scrutiny but
sufficiently impacts speech such that rational-basis review is inappropriate).
187. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring); Smolla, supra note 15, at 1118.
188. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 545 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
189. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1119. Compare Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("I consequently agree with the Court's holding that the statutes as applied here violate
the Constitution, but I would not extend that holding beyond these present circumstances.") with
id. at 551 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The same logic applies here and demonstrates that the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential to further
the interest of protecting the privacy of individual communications.").
190. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1118 ("Astonishingly, at no point in Justice Stevens's
opinion does the Court come right out and say what standard of review or doctrinal test it is
applying to the laws before it.").
191. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 (Breyer, J., concurring).
192. See id. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 527-29.
194. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1121.
195. See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 526 (challenging statute prohibiting publication of
names of victims of sex offenses); Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 98 (challenging statute prohibiting
publication of juveniles charged as offenders); see also Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 545 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Each of the laws at issue in the Daily Mail cases regulated the content or subject
matter of speech."); Smolla, supra note 15, at 1129.
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dictates that government can punish publication only to serve an interest of the
"highest order," seemingly synonymous with the "compelling interest" required
as part of strict scrutiny. 196 And, although the Court continues to refuse to say
categorically that truthful publication never can be punished,' 97 it has yet to find
any government interest of a sufficiently high order to justify punishing the
publication of truthful, lawfully obtained information on a matter of public
concern.' 98 Daily Mail analysis smacks of strict scrutiny, demanding the tightest
fit between the law and the sought-after interest in order to be the least restrictive
means for serving that interest. 99 In Florida Star, for example, both Justice
Marshall's majority and Justice Scalia's concurring opinions made much of the
underinclusiveness of the regulation at issue (in terms of the expression it left
unregulated), which called into question whether the law could be the least-
restrictive means to serve those interests. 2°°
Daily Mail (and thus Bartnicki) marks a theoretical break from the content
distinction, perhaps explaining the apparent use of strict-scrutiny-like review of a
non-content-based law. A central criticism of the content distinction is that
content-neutral regulations severely impair free-speech interests by reducing the
sum total of information and opinion that gets disseminated, spoken, and heard
in public discourse.2°' Whatever value one believes free expression serves and
whatever rationale one adopts for protecting expression, it is undermined as
much by content-neutral regulations that (even if evenhandedly and equally
applied to all speech) reduce the total quantity of available public expression.20 2
Daily Mail and its progeny rest on a similar impulse that a greater quantum
of speech is better for First Amendment purposes. Just as Martin Redish would
apply the same heightened scrutiny to content-neutral as content-based laws,
20 3
196. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1118-19; see also Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-28 (quoting
Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103); Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (requiring the prohibition to be
"narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order"); Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 101-02 (stating
that imposing penal sanctions for publishing truthful information "requires the highest form of state
interest to sustain its validity").
197. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
198. See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532; Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104.
199. See Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 101-02.
200. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540 ("[Tjhe facial underinclusiveness ... raises serious
doubts about whether Florida is, in fact, serving, with this statute, the significant interests.. ."); id.
at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that a law cannot be
regarded as serving an interest of the highest order "when it leaves appreciable damage to that
supposedly vital interest unprohibited").
201. See REDISH, supra note 89, at 102; Williams, supra note 77, at 664.
202. See REDISH, supra note 89, at 103; see also Clark, 468 U.S. at 313-14 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("The consistent imposition of silence upon all may fulfill the dictates of an even
handed content-neutrality. But it offends our "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.") (quoting New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 264, 270 (1964)).
203. See REDISH, supra note 89, at 117 (arguing that courts should subject all restrictions on
expression to the "same critical scrutiny traditionally reserved for regulations drawn in terms of
content").
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Daily Mail imposes strict scrutiny to strike down (thus far) any effort, content-
based or (after Bartnicki) content-neutral, that limits the sum total of truthful
speech on matters of public concern that will be disseminated. Daily Mail seeks
to stop not government skewing of debate by limiting some subjects or
viewpoints (the ordinary justification for heightened scrutiny of content-based
laws) 2°4, but government keeping of truthful information out of the public
debate, regardless of its substance and source.
To the extent that Justice Stevens could be seen as applying intermediate
scrutiny to this content-neutral law, as Justice Breyer unquestionably did in
agreeing that § 251 l(1)(c) was unconstitutional, the case remains unique simply
because the Court invalidated the law, an exceedingly rare result under
intermediate review.20 5  Justices Stevens and Breyer both found the
government's interest in protecting the personal privacy of telephone
conversationalists to be important, but outweighed in the balance, whether
generally (Stevens) or on the particular facts and speech at hand (Breyer).2° But
intermediate-scrutiny balancing almost never tips against laws that regulate
without regard to content.20 7 The majority and concurrence obviously demanded
more of Congress than courts ordinarily do and found governmental
justifications lacking.
204. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
205. Since the establishment of the modem content distinction during Burger Court, the
Supreme Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to strike down content-neutral statutes in only two
cases. See Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 164-69 (2002)
(striking down village ordinance requiring permits for door-to-door advocacy); Gilleo, 512 U.S. at
54-58 (striking down ordinance prohibiting display of signs on residential property). And both can
be seen as involving unusual content-neutral laws. The permit requirement in Watchtower swept
up a large amount of speech in its net, requiring a permit before one could speak to her neighbors,
"a dramatic departure from our national heritage." Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 166. The
problem with the ordinance in Gilleo was that the communicative medium of one's own home was
unique, affecting the particular and distinct message actually presented, to cut-off that medium was
to cut-off that unique message. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 56-57; see also Timothy Zick, Speech and
Spatial Tactics, 84 TEx. L. REv. 581, 638-39 (2006) (describing regulations on place as "content-
correlated" where the regulation of place affects or alters the message). The Court also has struck
down portions of two content-neutral injunctions, applying more than intermediate scrutiny
(because these were injunctions not statutes) but less than strict scrutiny (because they were content
neutral). See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764-66 (1994); id. at 757
(holding that some provisions of the injunction satisfy the First Amendment, but not others); see
also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 361 (1997) (same); cf. Madsen, 512 U.S. at
791 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (deriding the standard as
"intermediate-intermediate scrutiny" and complaining that the "difference between it and
intermediate scrutiny (which the Court acknowledges is inappropriate for injunctive restrictions on
speech) is frankly too subtle for me to describe").
206. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534 ("[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced against the
interest in publishing matters of public importance."); id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[T]he
speakers had little or no legitimate interests in maintaining the privacy of the particular
conversation." (emphasis in original)); Smolla, supra note 15, at 1145-46.
207. See supra notes 110-119, 205 and accompanying text.
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Interestingly, this might be the rare case in which a law would fail
intermediate scrutiny anyway. Section 251(1 (l)(c) worked an absolute ban on the
disclosure of the lawfully obtained contents of communications of public
concern; the law left open no alternative channels of communication for the
innocent recipient and no alternative means to publish this important
208information. True intermediate scrutiny here would have looked much like the
intermediate scrutiny applied in Gilleo: the law entirely cut off a unique mode of
communication that carried with it a distinct message, leaving no meaningful
alternative communicative outlet, a fatal defect even if the law did not regulate
based on content.
209
2. Second-guessing Congress
The Bartnicki Court also disregarded legislative context in performing its
constitutional analysis.210  Section 2511(1)(c) was not a stand-alone speech
restriction and cannot fairly be described as an effort to silence debate or censor
information.21' Congress did not seem immediately concerned with prohibiting
the disclosure of the information that might be contained in electronic and wire
communications; rather, this provision supplemented the broader statutory
prohibition on the interception of electronic, wire, and voice communication.212
The anti-disclosure provision was intended to operate on a "drying-up-the-
market" theory.213 Congress believed that eliminating any legal downstream
outlet for intercepted communications would eliminate the incentive for
upstream interception in the first instance. 2 14  A perpetrator with a political,
personal, or business axe to grind would be less likely to intercept a
communication if there were no legal way that the conversation could be
disclosed to the press and thus no legal way to publicly embarrass her adversary;
conversely, knowing that an unconnected downstream stranger could publish
(widely) with impunity, she may be more willing to intercept and pass the
215
conversation along anonymously by dropping a tape on the media's doorstep.
208. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see supra notes 105-114 and accompanying text. I thank
Eugene Volokh for pointing this out.
209. See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 56-57 (holding that there was no substitute for the "important
medium of speech that [the city had] closed off').
210. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526-27.
211. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1175 ("Nor are laws that seek to deter trafficking in the
contraband of antisocial acts laws passed out of the sinister censorial motives that offend the core
of the First Amendment.").
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000).
213. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1132 ("[Llegislatures routinely make the judgment that it is
as important to dry up the market for contraband as it is to attack its initial creation.").
214. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529; Smolla, supra note 15, at 1140 ("[Tihe presence of a
liability-free media ready to publicize the intercept material in the happy comfort of legal immunity
may well create an incentive for invasion, and penalizing disclosure may well ... work effectively
to dry up, if not entirely dry out, that high-visibility submarket.").
215. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1139-40.
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Justice Stevens would have none of it and in rejecting Congress's
justification he directly questioned its policy judgments.21 6 He insisted that
"[t]he normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate
punishment on the person who engages in it."' 217 If more deterrence becomes
necessary, Congress should impose higher penalties on the unlawful conduct
itself.
218
The Court did acknowledge an exception for the rare case in which direct
enforcement was too difficult and downstream regulation actually would
supplement direct enforcement and effectively deter upstream conduct.219 But
Congress had not attempted to justify § 2511(1)(c) as a response to the
220difficulties of enforcing the interception provisions. Worse, the Court cited
Congress's failure to provide empirical evidence to support the drying-the-
market theory, that is, to show that disincentivizing downstream disclosure
would reduce upstream interception. 22' The latter insistence seems unfair; given
the number of scanners out there and the small amount of information that gets
widely published, it is unlikely that Congress could gather such empirical
support.222
The dissent explicitly charged Lochnerism in response, accusing the
majority of failing to give sufficient deference to Congress's reasonable
legislative judgments as to the necessity and effectiveness of the law.223 The
drying-up-the-market theory was well-established and, as a matter of common
sense, perfectly logical.224 The majority's rejection of the theory thus "rests
upon nothing more than the bald substitution of its own prognostications in place
of the reasoned judgment of ... the United States Congress. 225 Indeed, Smolla
216. See id. at 1140 ("The Court seemed to have a fundamental difficulty with the drying up
argument...").
217. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529; see also Smolla, supra note 15, at 1140 (arguing that the
drying up argument "ran afoul of what the Court appeared to regard as the baseline norm: that as
law exists to deter transgression, it should punish actual transgressors").
218. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
219. Id. at 530; see Smolla, supra note 15, at 1133 ("One might simply seek to determine
whether the exclusion of further dissemination is in fact likely to dry up the market and thereby
deter illegal interceptions."); id. at 1140 ("[T]he Court reasoned that the drying up rationale would
be defensible only if one could make a case that for some reason it is especially difficult to find and
punish interceptors...").
220. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530.
221. Id. at 530-31 n.17; id. at 531 ("[T]here is no basis for assuming that imposing sanctions
upon [defendants] will deter the unidentified scanner from continuing to engage in surreptitious
interceptions.").
222. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1139; see also Volokh, Intellectual Property, supra note
171, at 743 (questioning Justice Stevens's assumption that the ban on dissemination would provide
little additional deterrent value).
223. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 550 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 550-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Were there no prohibition on disclosure, an
unlawful eavesdropper who wanted to disclose the conversation could anonymously launder the
interception through a third party and thereby avoid detection.").
225. Id. at 552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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argues that Justice Stevens' biggest mistake was that he "barely scratched the
surface" in analyzing the drying-up-the-market theory and the enforcement
difficulties that the disclosure provision was designed, and reasonably could be
expected, to ease.226 In Lochnerian terms, the majority concluded that Congress
had made an unwise, unjustified policy choice, one that therefore is
unconstitutional.221
3. Old-World Constitutional Values and Ideological Drift
The overall prohibition on the interception of electronic, wire, and oral
228
communications represents a congressional effort to protect personal privacy.
It was in part a regulation of the economic marketplace: some of the electronic
eavesdropping that Congress sought to halt arose in the context of corporate
spying and industrial espionage. 229 In striking down such a law, Neil Richards
argues, the Court's analysis risks "the creep of First Amendment analysis into
the economic rights and commercial context," in disregard of "the basic and
essential division between civil and economic rights at the core of modem
constitutionalism.
' 230
One could view Bartnicki as a case in which constitutional rights were pitted
directly against one another, to be balanced by the court. 231 Alternatively, and
more accurately, the balance is between a constitutional interest in freedom from
government-imposed restrictions on expression and a statutorily created privacy
right in certain communications as against other private actors that functions as a
substantial or compelling government interest in support of the law.232 However
we define those interests, the Court did balance, passing judgment (ultimately
negative) on the propriety of the accommodation that Congress struck in the anti-
disclosure provision, insisting that "privacy concerns give way when balanced
against the interest in publishing matters of public importance. 233
226. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1140; id. at 1139 ("On a nonquantitative level, however,
there is something to the 'drying up' argument, something tied to the creeping tabloidization of
modem American mass culture.").
227. See supra Part I.C.
228. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526; supra notes 143-15 1.
229. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530 n. 16 (citing legislative history).
230. Richards, supra note 3, at 1152.
231. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533 ("[I]t seems to us that there are important interests to be
considered on both sides of the constitutional calculus." (emphasis in original)); id. at 536 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (describing this as case in which "important competing constitutional interests are
implicated"); Smolla, supra note 15, at 1150 ("From the broadest perspective, Bartnicki accepted
the premise that the conflict posed between speech and privacy is a conflict between two rights of
constitutional stature.").
232. See Volokh, Information Privacy, supra note 67, at 1107 ("[Tlhe speech vs. privacy...
tensions are not tensions between constitutional rights on both sides. The Constitution
presumptively prohibits government restrictions on speech and perhaps some government
revelation of personal information, but it says nothing about interference with speech or revelation
of personal information by nongovernmental speakers.").
233. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534.
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What has changed of late-and what arguably puts the Bartnicki majority in
the position of retrograde Lochnerian guardian of the old constitutional order-is
how it struck that balance compared to recent solicitude for privacy interests in
the face of free speech claims.234 Smolla suggests there was "a lameness to the
assertion by Justice Stevens that anytime an otherwise private conversation
implicates matters of public concerns, freedom of speech must trump the right to
privacy. 235  The outcome places the Bartnicki Court at odds with recent
commentary urging the Court to adjust free speech in the name of protecting
personal privacy as a countervailing civil right.236 Certainly Justice Breyer was
far more receptive to the plaintiffs' claims of privacy in their communications.237
He rejected the disclosure provision as applied only after characterizing the
plaintiffs as public figures and the subject of the conversation at issue as a
genuine true threat of violence against persons and property (blowing off
porches and doing work on those guys), rather than a hyperbolic discussion of a
high-profile policy dispute, in which they had no legitimate expectation of
238privacy. A different conversation might have yielded a different balance of
speech and privacy from Justice Breyer and a different outcome.239
The outcome of the speech/privacy balance in Bartnicki also contrasts
strikingly with the balance that Justice Stevens himself struck for the Court in
Hill v. Colorado.24° Hill involved a challenge to a state law regulating sidewalk
protests outside and around health clinics; the law prohibited speakers from
approaching within eight feet of non-consenting clinic patrons "for the purpose
of ... engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling." 241 Writing for the
Court, Justice Stevens held that the law was a content-neutral regulation of the
time, place, and manner of speech outside clinics that was justified without
234. See infra notes 235-45 and accompanying text.
235. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1145; see also Strauss, Wrong, supra note 3, at 386 ("[Jludicial
review requires courts to recognize the complexity of the issues they confront...").
236. See Volokh, Information Privacy, supra note 67, at 1106 ("Speech that reveals personal
information about others, the argument goes, violates their basic human rights, strips them of their
dignity, causes serious emotional distress, interferes with their relations with family, friends,
acquaintances, and business associates, and puts them at risk of crime."); see also Gindin, supra
note 138, at 1222 ('Ihe United States needs a comprehensive federal policy guaranteeing
individuals the right to control the collection and distribution of their personal information.");
Richards, supra note 3, at 1151 (arguing that "the relationship between privacy and the First
Amendment is complex, but.., not irreconcilable").
237. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 539-40 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Smolla, supra note 15, at 1144 ("Justices
Breyer and O'Connor seemed offended by the conversation between Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony
Kane, treating it not as angry 'union-talk' but as actual authentic discussion of the need to engage
in violence against persons and property.").
239. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1144 ("Had Bartnicki and Kane been merely expressing
their anger at the school board for its negotiating positions, Justices Breyer and O'Connor might
not have gone alone with Justice[] Stevens .....
240. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
241. Id. at 707 n. 1. The law banned such activities at all health care facilities, but was aimed
primarily at protests around reproductive health clinics. Id. at 715.
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reference to the viewpoint or content of any particular expression that may occur
there and that survived intermediate scrutiny.242
Importantly, he accepted the governmental interest in protecting unwilling
listeners (women entering the clinics) from being assaulted by unwanted face-to-
face speech outside the clinic, a privacy-based right to be let alone that
outweighed protesters' countervailing free speech rights.243 Perhaps a woman
having to walk a gauntlet of potentially hostile anti-abortion protesters is more
vulnerable in her privacy and mental well-being than Bartnicki and Kane and
their talk of "getting 'dose' guys," making legal protection from the speech of
others more essential. 244 Alternatively, Justice Scalia explains Hill solely in
terms of First Amendment ideological drift, another example of the left's
abandonment of free speech in order to protect other rights-here the right to
reproductive freedom undeterred by up-close, face-to-face protesters.245
The anti-wiretap law in Bartnicki fits the mold of a speech/privacy balance
struck amid a First Amendment drifting rightward ideologically.246  Political
progressivism would seem to favor protecting personal privacy from the probing
(electronically enhanced) ears of those with personal, commercial, legal, and
political axes to grind.247 The political left also may appreciate that the anti-
242. Id. at 719-20 (explaining why statute is content-neutral); id. at 725-26 (explaining why
content-neutral statute survives intermediate scrutiny).
243.. Id. at 716-17 ("The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has
been repeatedly identified in our cases. It is an aspect of the broader 'right to be let alone' that one
of our wisest Justices characterized as 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men."' (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting))); id. at 716 ("The recognizable privacy interest in avoiding unwanted communication
varies widely in different settings."); see also id. at 738 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he reason for
the [statute's] restriction on approaches goes to the approaches, not to the content of the speech of
those approaching. What is prohibited is a close encounter when the person addressed does not
want to get close."); Kitrosser, supra note 118, at 1368 ("The Court also emphasized the
importance of the state interest in allowing individuals to shield themselves from overly intrusive
communications, especially in situations where such intrusiveness could be traumatic, such as prior
to entering a hospital or clinic as a patient.").
244. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 715 (describing "a special focus on unimpeded access to health care
facilities and the avoidance of potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational
protests"); Kitrosser, supra note 118, at 1339 (describing the range of expression that might
confront a woman seeking to enter a clinic); id. at 1404-05 (describing the meaning of Court
findings that patients entering clinics are in vulnerable states and subject to protection from
disturbing face-to-face messages).
245. Hill, 530 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What is before us, after all, is a speech
regulation directed against the opponents of abortion, and it therefore enjoys the benefit of the 'ad
hoc nullification machine' that the Court has set in motion to push aside whatever doctrines of
constitutional law stand in the way of that highly favored practice." (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at
785 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part))); id. at 764 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing Hill as "not an isolated distortion of our traditional constitutional principles,
but [] one of many aggressively pro-abortion novelties announced by the Court in recent years").
246. See supra notes 126-142 and accompanying text.
247. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1104-05 (describing areas in which electronic snooping on
others' privacy occurs); see also Boehner v. McDermott, 441 F.3d 1010, 1012-13 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
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disclosure provision enhances private speech, furthering the "more speech"
values of the First Amendment; by ensuring that one's expression remains
private if the speaker chooses to keep it private and only becomes public if she
makes it public, the law removes a deterrent that might cause individuals to
refrain from speaking. 248 Similarly, recent proposals for rules protecting privacy
in personal and consumer information-from the goods one buys, to one's
hobbies, reading preferences, or pet ownership249-sound in efforts to protect
consumers from the objectionable practices of large business and commercial
interests, akin to much New Deal legislation.25 ° Such protections, not grounded
in an attempt to censor a speaker from speaking her mind in a public arena, it is
argued, are more acceptable in a free-speech regime.
251
It remains to be seen whether the speech/privacy collision produces a First
Amendment "constitutional moment" akin to 1937.252 As Eugene Volokh
argues, "[p]rivacy is a popular word, and government attempts to 'protect our
privacy' are easy to endorse. 253  Bartnicki on its face does not reflect or
implement such a moment.254 But Smolla argues that the case could become a
"backhanded victory" for privacy as against speech, given the ambiguities in
Justice Stevens's opinion and the narrower approach in Justice Breyer's
concurrence that might have gone the other way on different facts.255 Smolla
(discussing a § 2511(1)(c) action arising from an intercepted call involving one member of
Congress disclosed to the press by another member of Congress).
248. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring).
249. See Richards, supra note 3, at 1157-58; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation:
Personal Infornation and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553,
554 (1995); Volokh, Information Privacy, supra note 67, at 1117.
250. See Richards, supra note 3, at 1158 ("In addition to being intrusive and deeply unsettling
to many people, the multibillion dollar profiling industry provides the lifeblood of data on which
the direct marketing industry survives.").
251. See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1150.
252. See 2 ACKRgMAN, supra note 35, at 346 ("Constitutional moments must come to an end.
The People must be allowed to move on to other things with a sense that all of their passionate
political argument and activity hasn't been in vain...").
253. Volokh, Information Privacy, supra note 67, at 1050.
254. See supra Part lI.B.1.
255. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1149-50; id. at 1144 (discussing possibility that, on different
facts, Justices Breyer and O'Connor might have joined the dissent). There is scholarly debate as to
how to read both the Stevens and Breyer opinions. Nominally, Justice Stevens wrote for a majority
of six (including Justices Breyer and O'Connor) and Justice Breyer's was a concurring opinion.
But Justice Breyer took such a different, narrower analytical approach that Justice Stevens's
opinion may be better understood as a four-justice plurality and Justice Breyer's opinion as one
concurring in the judgment and providing the final two votes for the result, but not the reasoning.
See Smolla, supra note 15, at 1113-14; see also Sonja West, Concurring in Part and Concurring in
the Confusion, 104 MICH. L. REV -, - (2006) (manuscript at 4-5) (criticizing the confusion
created in lower courts by Supreme Court concurring opinions, using Justice Breyer's Bartnicki
opinion as an example of the uncertainty). As a practical matter, Justice Breyer's approach-more
receptive to privacy rationales and privacy-protecting legislation and less absolutist about free-
speech protection-may become the controlling opinion in the lower courts. See Smolla, supra
note 15, at 1116. Bartnicki may repeat the history of Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972),
where Justice Powell nominally joined the majority opinion categorically rejecting a constitutional
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suggests that Bartnicki "does not shut the door on the prohibition of privacy
contraband" and at the very least leaves the constitutional issues "largely in
play.' z 6 It remains to be seen whether we reach a different tipping point in the
doctrinal balance between speech and privacy.
C. Bartnicki's potential application and non-application
If Bruce Ackerman is correct that judges fear the Lochnerism charge above
all else,257 then it should not be surprising that, five years later, Bartnicki's
impact has been virtually non-existent. Lower courts have limited the decision's
effect by narrowly construing and applying it, perhaps fearing the dreaded
charge of Lochnerism.258 Statutes and other government acts do not fall in the
face of Bartnicki analysis because Bartnicki's basic constitutional rule-
government may not punish the dissemination of truthful, lawfully obtained
information on a matter of public concern-is held to be inapplicable to the case
at hand.259  This allows courts to avoid even the limited, open-ended, right-
against-right balancing that Justice Breyer endorsed and that could go either way
depending on the facts. 2 °
Consider, for example, the D.C. Circuit's non-use of Bartnicki as applied to
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), a consumer protection statute imposing
various obligations and restrictions on consumer reporting agencies designed to
protect the privacy and accuracy of consumers' credit information. 26 1 The
statute creates broad privacy rights in consumer credit reports, broadly defined
as the communication of information "bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living. '262 The law is one of several legal efforts,
actual and proposed, to protect privacy in, and prohibit inappropriate uses of,
consumers' personal, economic, and financial information by business
interests.263
reporter-source privilege, then wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that such a privilege could
exist on a balancing approach, an opinion then adopted by many lower courts to recognize a
qualified constitutional privilege. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1114-16; id. at 1116 ("If to live by the
concurrence is to die by the concurrence, the press's victory in Bartnicki could over time prove as
pyrrhic as its defeat in Branzburg.").
256. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1150.
257. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 269.
258. See, e.g., Trans Union III, 267 F.3d at 1138.
259. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
261. See Trans Union 11, 245 F.3d at 811-12; 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000); see also Gindin, supra
note 138, at 1206-07 (discussing FCRA and its purpose).
262. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2000); Trans Union II, 245 F.3d at 813 (stating that this definition is
not very demanding because "almost any information about consumers arguably bears on their
personal characteristics or mode of living").
263. See Richards, supra note 3, at 1167-68 (describing range of statutes seeking to protect
consumers from inappropriate uses of personal data by businesses); Volokh, Information Privacy,
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The Federal Trade Commission found that Trans Union Corporation, a
reporting agency, had improperly sold consumer credit reports to target
marketers, an unapproved use under the statute,264 a conclusion that the D.C.
Circuit affirmed in April 2001.265 The court then considered a First Amendment
challenge to the FCRA and the FTC's determination, concluding that the speech
at issue (disclosure of credit information) was not on a matter of public concern,
because the information only was of interest to Trans Union and its direct-
marketer customers.266 The statute was subject only to intermediate scrutiny,
which it easily survived, given the government's substantial interest in protecting
the privacy of consumer information.267
Trans Union then moved for reconsideration in the court of appeals, in part
arguing that Bartnicki changed the appropriate constitutional analysis.268 The
court quickly disposed of the argument, stating that Bartnicki, and other cases in
the Daily Mail line, was inapplicable where the speech was not on a matter of
public concern. 26 9  And, as the court already had found, consumer credit
information is a matter of purely private business and commercial interest.
270
That basic limiting principle meant this straight-forward economic regulation
was not subject to even potentially Lochnerian heightened constitutional review;
nor was Congress required to put forward an interest of the highest order to
justify the regulation because the highly protective constitutional rule was
inapplicable.
Bartnicki was inapplicable, however, only because of a stunted view of what
constitutes matters of public concern for purposes of Daily Mail.271 In part, this
is a holdover from the Court's earlier decision in Dun & Bradstreet,272 holding
that statements in a credit report about a company's bankruptcy were not matters
of public concern because only of interest to the company and its customers.273
In part this is a built-in limitation on Bartnicki itself, where the Court suggested
supra note 67, at 1117 ("[M]any of the proposals to restrict communication of consumer
transactional data would apply far beyond a narrow core of highly private information, and would
cover all transactional information, such as the car, house, food, or clothes one buys.").
264. Trans Union 11, 245 F. 3d at 812-13.
265. Id. at 815-16.
266. Id. at 818 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762
(1985)); see also Trans Union III, 267 F.3d at 1140 (reasserting that Trans Union's speech, as per
Dun & Bradstreet, "solely interests the speaker (Trans Union) and its 'specific business audience'
(its customers)").
267. Trans Union 1I, 245 F. 3d at 818.
268. Trans Union 111, 267 F. 3d at 1140-41.
269. Id.
270. See id. at 1141.
271. See Volokh, Intellectual Property, supra note 171, at 743 ("Every time the Court has
decided that certain speech is not on a matter of public concern, it has erred.").
272. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
273. Id. at 762; see also Volokh, Intellectual Property, supra note 171, at 744 (stating that it
would surprise employees, creditors, and customers of the bankrupt company to learn that the
bankruptcy was not a matter of public concern).
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a different speech/privacy balance would prevail were "trade secrets or domestic
gossip or other information of purely private concern" at issue.274 Justice
Stevens seemed to hint that consumer credit information also would not be
protected because it did not satisfy the public-concern requirement.275
We return to Neil Richards's argument that the First Amendment critique
(grounded in Bartnicki and Bartnicki's adoption of the Daily Mail rule) of the
sort of data-privacy laws at issue in Trans Union devolves into First Amendment
Lochnerism. 276 By preempting the broadest reach of Bartnicki, the D.C. Circuit
avoided the supposed Lochner trap, applying a more modest (and survivable)
balancing test.277 Relatedly, a court perhaps could limit Bartnicki only to cases
involving media defendants reporting on matters of public concern, thus
similarly inapplicable to disclosure of private information by a nonpress entity
engaged in ordinary commercial activity.278 Absent such limitations, Richards
would argue, the more rigorous balancing of Bartnicki would place the court in
the position of behaving like a Lochner-era court, with all the negatives
associated with that view.279
But a stronger application of Bartnicki means courts would more vigorously
protect free speech interests. The D.C. Circuit's narrow reading of Bartnicki thus
becomes problematic. Certainly, consumer credit information is not part of the
broad political debate. But that need not be the limit of the concept of public
import. 280  Eugene Volokh describes personal information such as consumer
credit data as speech on "daily life matters," a category of expression at least as
worthy of protection, in terms of the import of its use to speaker and listener, as
art . ~281 T at
art and movies. In fact, because such speech is "related to the real everyday
life experiences of ordinary people" and dictates how we deal with others, it
arguably is of greater value to individual choices and action than political
editorials.282 The consumer and credit information sold by Trans Union would
be useful to direct marketers, individuals, and businesses in determining whom
274. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
275. See id.
276. See Richards, supra note 3, at 1212-13 ("[Tlhere are some fairly strong parallels between
the traditional conception of Lochner and the First Amendment critique of data privacy
legislation.").
277. See Trans Union 11, 267 F.3d at 1140-41; Trans Union II, 245 F3d at 818.
278. See Richards, supra note 3, at 1199.
279. See id. at 1213.
280. See infra notes 281-284 and accompanying text.
281. See Volokh, Information Privacy, supra note 67, at 1092-93; see also REDISH, supra note
89, at 50 ("[I]f an individual is given the opportunity to control his or her destiny ... he or needs
all possible information that might aid in making these life-affecting decisions.").
282. Volokh, Information Privacy, supra note 67, at 1092-93; see also REDISH, supra note 89,
at 61 ("[I]nformation and opinion about competing commercial products and services undoubtedly
aid the individual in making countless life-affecting decisions...").
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they would like to do business and otherwise relate with, surely a matter of
concern to their successful operations.283
In Trans Union, the analytical impact of this more expansive conception of
public concern would have meant some level of balancing (whether Justice
Stevens's weighted, strict-scrutiny-esque or Justice Breyer's more open-ended)
between the government's asserted interest in protecting consumer privacy and
Trans Union's interest in publishing (and its customers in receiving) truthful
information unquestionably lawfully obtained. The circuit court's approach
assured that this balancing never occurred.284
IIl. CONCLUSION
I close on some normative points. Bartnicki-specifically the broader, strict-
scrutiny-sounding, highly speech-protective approach established in Justice
Stevens's opinion-was correct. The asserted privacy interests did not outweigh
the expressive need for publication, particularly where the conversation revealed
potential political misfeasance.285 On the other hand, lower courts have failed to
apply the full scope of Bartnicki, as illustrated by two decisions from the D.C.
Circuit. One is Trans Union, in which the court took a cramped view of what
constitutes a matter of public concern for Daily Mail purposes.286 The other,
more problematic case, is Boehner v. McDermott,287 where a divided court of
appeals held, in a wiretap third-party disclosure case, that Bartnicki did not
protect a third-party who knew the identity of the interceptor and knew that the
communication had been intercepted unlawfully, even if the third party was
uninvolved in the interception. 288 That decision essentially deprives Bartnicki of
any bite; it should be obvious to any recipient of a recorded conversation
283. See Volokh, Information Privacy, supra note 67, at 1093-94. Volokh has been the
leading critic of information-privacy regulations that raise First Amendment concerns, such that
Richards labels the First Amendment arguments "Volokhner". Richards, supra note 3, at 1210.
284. See Trans Union 11, 267 F. 3d at 1140-41.
285. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518-19 (involving disclosure of intercepted telephone
conversation between two union leaders in midst of high-profile labor dispute); Boehner v.
McDermott, 441 F.3d 1010, 1012-13 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (involving disclosure of intercepted
telephone conversation among Republican members of Congress discussing how to respond to
ethics probe of Republican Speaker of the House).
286. See supra notes 261-284 and accompanying text.
287. 441 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
288. Id. at 1015 ("[T]o hold that a person who knowingly receives a tape from an illegal
interceptor either aids and abets the interceptor's second violation (the disclosure), or participates
in the illegal transaction would be to take the [Bartnicki] Court at its word."); id. at 1016-17
(emphasizing the difference between someone who discovers a bag containing a stolen diamond
ring on the sidewalk and someone who accepts the same bag from the thief knowing the ring inside
is stolen); but see id. at 1020 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing that Bartnicki does not turn on the
discloser's knowledge that a communication was unlawfully intercepted, only on his actual
participation in the unlawful interception).
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(including Yocum and Vopper) 289 that the conversation likely had been
unlawfully intercepted.
This is not to say necessarily that protecting consumer or other privacy
interests ever can or never can be an interest of the highest order.290 Nor is it to
define a categorical balance between free speech and other constitutional,
political, and social values. Rather, a substantive discussion of how to create
constitutional doctrine that strikes the best balance among competing interests
would be welcome.29' Certainly other western liberal democratic societies that
share a commitment to freedom of speech draw a quite-different balance
between expression and competing values such as privacy and individual
dignity.292
The point is that slapping the Lochnerism tag on a decision such as Bartnicki
does not advance the discussion. Lochner ends debate, by definition and
intention, de-legitimizing the decision on its own terms.293 And it does so with a
pejorative term whose meaning we do not know and cannot agree upon and
whose assumed meaning runs a broad range.294
It is more beneficial to begin from the premise that the Barnicki Court acted
in a structurally and procedurally legitimate manner in striking down the wiretap
disclosure provision or, hypothetically, in using Bartnicki as precedent to strike
down other information-privacy rules. Perhaps, although structurally proper, the
Court simply failed to understand the complexity of the issues or to recognize
that it is possible to protect First Amendment rights while also accommodating
289. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525 (accepting plaintiffs' assertions that defendants at a minimum
had reason to know the interception was unlawful).
290. See id. at 529 (describing the "Court's repeated refusal to answer categorically whether
truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment").
291. See Fiss, IRONY, supra note 89, at 26 ("We should never forget the potential of the state
for oppression, never, but at the same time, we must contemplate the possibility that the state will
use its considerable powers to promote goals that lie at the core of a democratic society [such as]
equality."); compare Richards, supra note 3, at 1222 ("[T]he First Amendment is being used as [a]
screen, to infringe upon legitimate modes of government privacy regulation.") and Smolla, supra
note 15, at 1175 ("[B]alanced measures are called for, and sometimes there is room in our
constitutional system for a measure of balance."); with Volokh, Information Privacy, supra note
67, at 1051 ("We already have a code of 'fair information practices,' and it is the First Amendment
.... ") and Volokh, Intellectual Property, supra note 171, at 748 (arguing that the First
Amendment "continues to impose important limits" on several areas of the law).
292. See Schauer, supra note 4, at 192 (discussing fact that "non-American equivalents [to the
First Amendment] tend, interestingly, not to be used in the same way in other societies"); Frederick
Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment at 3 (unpublished manuscript on file with the author)
("[T]he American understanding of freedom of expression is substantively exceptional compared to
international standards because a range of American outcomes and American resolutions of
conflicts between freedom of expression and other rights and goals are starkly divergent from the
outcomes and resolutions reached in most other liberal democracies.").
293. See Ely, supra note 3, at 939-40 (arguing that the charge that a decision is grounded in the
philosophy of Lochner "alone should be enough to damn it"); Richards, supra note 3, at 1213
(describing the ability and temptation "to accuse the critics of Lochnerism and move on").
294. See Strauss, Wrong, supra note 3, at 374; supra Part I.
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other constitutional and legislative values that may be in tension with those
rights.295 That is an issue worth considering.
But speaking in terms of Lochner and Lochnerism leaves no room to discuss
necessary substantive First Amendment questions. It simply leaves us
wondering whether, one hundred years from now, the constitutional canon and
anti-canon might change again.296 Perhaps we will have our Ackermanian
constitutional moment, after which we will come to think of the freedom of
speech (or at least certain applications of the freedom of speech reaching
particular political outcomes) the way we now think of liberty of contract and
economic substantive due process.297 But that would not mean that Bartnicki
was wrong and certainly would not mean it was illegitimate, only that
constitutional values had changed.298
295. See Strauss, Wrong, supra note 3, at 386 (arguing that the problem with Lochner was not
protection of freedom of contract, but the Court's failure to grasp the greater complexity of the
social, political, and legal issues).
296. See Balkin, Wrong, supra note 2, at 692 ("Just as some conservative and libertarian
scholars could see Lochner as less inhospitable, some liberal scholars could find Lochner less
threatening.").
297. See supra notes 252-56.
298. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 280 ("Lochner is no longer good law because the
American people repudiated Republican constitutional values in the 1930's, not because the
Republican Court was wildly out of line with them before the Great Depression.").
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